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We cross-sectionally analyze the presence of aggregated hidden depth and trade volume
in the S&P 500 and identify its key determinants. We find that the spread is the main
predictor for a stock’s hidden dimension, both in terms of traded and posted liquidity. Our
findings moreover suggest that large hidden orders are associated with larger transaction
costs, higher price impact and increased volatility. In particular, as large hidden orders fail
to attract (latent) liquidity to the market, hidden liquidity provision gives rise to negative
liquidity externalities.
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Hidden liquidity is an indispensable feature of today’s electronic exchanges. Recent studies
indicate that hidden liquidity comprises a substantial and growing proportion of overall liquid-
ity. Understanding the motifs of hidden order submission, the determinants of hidden liquidity,
as well as its impact on market dynamics is of growing importance to investors, regulators,
policy-makers, and exchanges alike. We identify which observable stock characteristics most
strongly relate to hidden liquidity provision in order-driven markets, and analyze the impact
of hidden liquidity on different dimensions of the market. Our results suggest a negative liq-
uidity externality associated with large hidden orders: unlike large displayed orders they fail to
attract additional (latent) liquidity. We also find that unexecuted hidden orders are canceled
and resubmitted as a series of market orders thereby increasing post-submission returns. As a
result, large hidden orders often carry information about future price movements and tend to
increase realized volatility.
1.1 Hidden Liquidity in Modern Exchanges
Most of today’s order-driven electronic-exchanges provide hidden liquidity in the form of specific
order types. The most prominent one is the so-called “Iceberg Order”. An iceberg order is a
passive order that has been split into smaller parts of which just a small proportion is visible
to the public (if at all). Hiding the actual order quantity reduces information leakage as well
as price movements and order flows caused by substantial changes in a stock’s supply (market
impact). Order-splitting is a standard trade strategy of institutional investors (Foster and
Vishwanathan, 1990; Keim and Madhavan, 1995), often automated through order/execution
management systems.
A series of empirical studies confirms the growing and substantial use of hidden orders among
most major stock exchanges. For instance, Pascual Gasco and Veredas (2008) report that 26%
of all trades on the Spanish Stock Exchanges involve hidden volume. Frey and Sandas (2009)
find that 9.3% of submitted and 15.9% of executed shares contain Iceberg orders on the German
Xetra Stock Exchange. De Winne and D’Hondt (2004; 2007; 2009) report that 27.2% (20.4)
of the total liquidity in the book is hidden for the French CAC40 (Belgian BEL20) exchanges
and moreover that the hidden ratios can even reach 50% at the best limit prices. Tuttle (2003)
finds that around 25% of liquidity for all NASDAQ National Market quotes are hidden. Further
studies confirm that hidden liquidity is particularly prevalent among large investors: D’Hondt
et al. (2004) report that 81% of orders with total sizes in the largest quartile are Iceberg orders
or (partly) hidden orders. Further supplementing these findings, Frey and Sandas (2009) find
that Iceberg orders are on average 12-20 times larger than limit orders. Bessembinder et al.
(2009); Aitken et al. (2001); De Winne and D’Hondt (2007) report similar findings, among
others.
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Various sources of risk associated with order-exposure – and hence motives to use hidden
liquidity – have been identified in the literature. Copeland and Galai (1983) propose adverse-
selection risk as the prime concern behind hidden liquidity origination. Harris (2003) attributes
exposure risk to the presence of so-called parasitic traders. He argues (p. ) that, at the
expense of limit order traders, these “rogue” traders exploit the free trading option of limit
orders by “front-running” them. In particular, the limit order trader will suffer higher liquidity
competition and eventually higher execution-risk.1 Among more theoretical works, Moinas
(2010) suggests that informed traders “scare-away” counter-party market order flow by exposing
too much of their intentions. Buti and Rindi (2008) study exposure-impact on the same-side
(limit) order flow. In contrast to Moinas and more in line with Harris’ view, they suggest
that uninformed liquidity traders have an interest in hiding their position as exposure can
increase same-side liquidity competition. Cebiroglu and Horst (2011) model both dimensions
simultaneously, same-side liquidity competition as well as opposite-side liquidity demand. Their
results suggest that market impact is primarily (though not exclusively) felt through same-side
liquidity competition and that at least partially hiding passive orders can substantially decrease
trading costs.
Although this and further empirical findings (Bessembinder et al., 2009; Frey and Sandas, 2009)
suggest that hidden liquidity provision can be beneficial to individual investors in certain cases,
it is still an ongoing debate whether or not it actually benefits market quality in general. For
instance, while findings in Aitken et al. (2001),Anand and Weaver (2004),Tuttle (2003) and Frey
and Sandas (2009) indicate that hidden liquidity provision attracts additional liquidity to the
market, Hendershott and Jones (2005) show that overall market quality in the Island electronic
communication network (ECN) deteriorated after responding to a September 2002 regulatory
enforcement to stop “displaying its limit order book in the three most active exchange-traded
funds (ETFs) where it was the dominant venue”. Edwards et al. (2004) and Bessembinder and
Maxwell (2008) report similar results for certain bond markets.
1.2 Our Contributions
The contribution of our paper is two-fold. First, we study the impact of hidden liquidity on the
stock market. Recent studies on the information content of hidden liquidity are to some degree
conflicting. For instance, Pascual and Tornero (2003), studying data from the Spanish Stock
Exchange, suggest that hidden order traders trade for liquidity and not for information reasons.
On the other hand, Frey and Sandas (2009), using data from the Frankfurt Stock Exchange,
1Note also, that the exposure impact is related to the field of studies that analyze how the visible (exposed)
portion of the order book affects the market. See Biais et al. (1995); Ranaldo (2004); Harris and Panchapagesan
(2005); Bessembinder et al. (2009); Griffiths et al. (2000); Chordia et al. (2002); De Winne and D’Hondt (2007);
Cao et al. (2009); Beber and Caglio (2005); Ellul et al. (2003); Pascual Gasco and Veredas (2008); Hautsch and
Huang (2009).
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report that undetected Iceberg orders carry information about future price movement, while
detected Icebergs do not. Finally, Tuttle (2003), analyzing NASDAQ National Market quotes,
finds that while displayed depth carries little information, aggregated hidden depth is indicative
of price changes even beyond 30 minutes post-trade. Our work further extends this line of
research. Using NASDAQ’s Modelview data set, we find that aggregated hidden liquidity
clusters around few price quotes and happens to enter the market sporadically. Displayed
depth on the other hand is more regular and more evenly distributed along both dimensions.
For instance, we report that while 80% of total displayed depth at the ten best price quotes is
concentrated on five prices quotes on average, hidden depth concentrates on average on only
2-3 price quotes. This suggest that the presence of hidden depth is associated with single large
orders (traders).
1.2.1 Impact of Hidden Liquidity
We test whether these single spikes of hidden liquidity are related to informed trading. Using
an event-study framework, we analyze the exante and expost impact of hidden (and displayed)
imbalances on different dimensions of the market, including spread, volatility, depth, and ab-
normal returns. We find strong evidence that large hidden imbalances (orders) are associated
with significant expost returns indeed, whereas displayed liquidity exerts almost no impact on
price returns. In comparing previous results on the return impact of Reuters news-items (Gross-
Klussmann and Hautsch, 2010), we find that the impact of hidden orders can even exceed the
impact of statistically significant earnings announcement news. Moreover, our results suggest
that (large) hidden orders are more likely to be submitted by traders who follow a trend, and
when volatility is low and spreads are narrow.
The Costs of Hidden Liquidity and Grossmann’s Conjecture
A growing number of empirical studies suggests that hidden liquidity is used by liquidity traders
(see Aitken et al. (2001); Pascual and Tornero (2003); Gozluklu (2010)). At the same time our
study suggests that hidden orders carry substantial information with respect to future prices.
To reconcile both facts, we use an analogy to Grossmann’s conjecture about markets without
upstairs negotiation; see Grossmann (1992). He argues that in pure downstairs markets, trading
must be costlier as investors cannot signal their interest-to-trade to latent liquidity (by this we
mean liquidity demand of traders that act primarily on observable liquidity supply). In partic-
ular, as non-discretionary2 liquidity demand typically exceeds the displayed liquidity supply in
primary markets, attracting latent (discretionary) liquidity is necessary to tap into additional
sources of liquidity. However, according to Admati and Pfleiderer (1988), discretionary liquid-
2We use non-discretionary in the sense of Admati and Pfleiderer (1988), i.e. traders that do not have
discretion over when to trade.
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ity traders3 prefer to trade in “thick” markets, in order to reduce their trading costs. Hence,
when investors hide their liquidity demand, discretionary traders will not be attracted to the
market. Consequently, faced with a reduced likelihood to execute their hidden orders, these
investors will eventually “cross the spread” and use market orders instead, effectively bypassing
“unexpressed” liquidity.
We report empirical evidence that large displayed orders do in fact attract latent liquidity, that
large hidden orders have a much lesser chance of being executed and that unexecuted hidden
orders are eventually cancel and resubmitted as a series of market orders. Large hidden orders
therefore tend to incur higher transaction costs and increase post-submission returns. It is in
this sense that they carry information about future price movements. This is often accompanied
by an increase in realized volatility. The very same stylized facts have previously been verified
for pure downstairs markets.4 Moreover, the fact that large traders use hidden orders, that are
less likely to get executed as compared to visible orders, indicates that hidden orders are used
by unaware and unsophisticated investors. These investors face higher transaction costs and
increase stock price volatility.
Volatility and Hidden Liquidity
The link between hidden liquidity and volatility has recently been studied in the literature,
albeit not extensively. The results are inconclusive. For instance, while Aitken et al. (2001)
report that volatility increases hidden order proportions (or vice versa), results of Bessembinder
et al. (2009) suggest that greater return volatility is associated with a lower likelihood of
hidden order usage.5 Our study indicates that these distinct observations are not necessarily
inconsistent but may rather refer to different aspects and dimensions of the interplay between
hidden liquidity and volatility. While the first study analyzes the cross-sectional aspect, the
latter looks at its intertemporal dimension. Our impact study shows that this discrepancy
between the cross-sectional and intertemporal dimension can be resolved when looking at the
post- and presubmission impact of hidden liquidity, where two distinct effects are observed.
Namely, (large) hidden order submission takes place when volatility is low. However, the
postsubmission impact involves a persistent and substantial increase in volatility, indicating
that hidden orders overall increase volatility.
3Discretionary traders can also be considered as opportunistic traders, in that they actively monitor the
market for liquidity opportunities. In particular, they have discretion over when to trade. In agency-brokerage
firms, this is typically facilitated by the DMA (Direct Market Access) desk.
4Bessembinder and Venkatamaran (2004); Smith et al. (2001); Booth et al. (2002).
5Indeed theoretical literature indicates that the role of volatility is ambiguous; see Moinas (2010).
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1.2.2 Determinants of Hidden Liquidity
Our second contribution is to identify visible stock characteristics that correlate most strongly
with hidden liquidity submission. We focus on determinants of hidden liquidity in general,
both in terms of traded as well as posted volumes. In particular, we study cross-sectionally
how the presence and magnitude of hidden depth relates to observable and readily available
stock characteristics. Earlier studies by, e.g., De Winne and D’Hondt (2007); Bessembinder
et al. (2009) and more recently Hautsch and Huang (2011), study the predictability of single
hidden orders. However, due to data limitations they are not able to detect all hidden orders.
Our approach is different. We are trying to understand cross-sectional variations instead of
temporal predictability and instead of taking a focus on predicting single orders, we look at
the broader picture of cross-sectional, aggregated hidden depth variation. Our work extends
the line of literature initiated in De Winne and D’Hondt (2009). They study how a stock’s tick
size, volatility, market capitalization, and trading activity relate to the posted hidden fraction
on the best limit. Their regression analysis reports a significant r2-goodness-of-fit of 0.292
points and indicates that the ratio of posted hidden liquidity decreases with tick sizes and
liquidity and increases with volatility. We extend their approach by incorporating additional
stock characteristics, like spread, price, overall depth, inter-trade time interval, trade size and
traded volume. Moreover, instead of using depth at the best limit price only, we incorporate
the full depth of the best ten price quotes. Our sample of N = 448 stocks is larger than their’s
using only 88 stocks. We not only look at posted liquidity, but also on traded liquidity and
estimate both hidden liquidity ratios and volumes separately.
Our explanatory models reach significantly higher r2-goodness-of-fit, 0.457 (0.515) for the
posted hidden volume (ratio) and 0.657 (0.849) for the traded hidden volume (ratio). Us-
ing suitable nonlinear transformations, we are able to bring the numbers up to 0.657 (0.695)
and to 0.803 (0.939) for traded hidden liquidity. In order to identify the hierarchy of determi-
nants for hidden liquidity, we additionally apply a LARS-procedure. First, we obtain that total
hidden volumes are best predicted by liquidity measures (with a less significant fit). Hidden
ratios, on the other hand, are governed mostly by the stock’s spread. For instance, we obtain
0.92 (0.29) points of r2 for traded (posted) hidden ratios if we only consider the stock’s spread.
1.2.3 Outline
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the data set and
presents descriptive statistics on traded and posted hidden liquidity for the S&P 500. Section 3
reports analysis on the determinants of hidden liquidity. In section 4 we use LARS regression to
provide a parsimonious model for posted and traded hidden liquidity in the S&P 500. Section




Our analysis will takes a view at both, traded as well as posted hidden liquidity for all stocks
from the S&P 500 during October 2008 and March 2009.We obtain posted hidden liquidity by
using the NASDAQ Modelview data set. This data set contains minute-by-minute snapshots
of the full aggregated order book depth, including visible and hidden depth for all NASDAQ-,
NYSE- and AMEX- listed stocks during the time period. The order book data is presented in
aggregated form, that is displayed and hidden volumes are aggregated to their total depths.
Our initial sample consists of all stocks that were continuously listed in the S&P 500 index
through the whole time period. To reduce the impact of outliers, we constrain our analysis
to stocks that show an average daily traded volume (ADV) of less then 50 million shares, 0.2
million average number of trades, average spread of less than 25 cents and average price of less
then 100$ (trade volumes are extracted from the Trade and Quote Database (TAQ) data set
provided by Deutsche Bank). We finally obtain a sample size of N = 448 shares. To reduce the
impact of opening and closing auctions we constrain our analysis to daily periods between 09:15
and 15:45. Thus, the daily sample size for each stock counts 390 minute-by-minute snapshots.
We also consider depth up to the best ten price levels and not beyond.
The Modelview data set provides information about posted (displayed and hidden) depth only.
To study traded/executed hidden liquidity we use TAQ data. However, it does not provide
additional information as to whether the traded volume was hidden. We therefore approximate
the traded hidden volumes by identifying them with trades that executed within the spread, as
every order executed within the spread, by definition, must have been hidden. We point out that
this assumption crucially depends on the reporting mechanism and the latency of reporting.
However, assuming that latency is far lower than the average inter-trade-arrival time and that
best bid and ask prices are adjusted after each trade immediately, it is reasonable to assume
that hidden order can only be executed within the spread.
Besides extracting the unobservable hidden volumes from the two data sets, we further con-
sider the stock’s main observable characteristic statistics: The average daily traded volume
(ADV ), the average inter-trade time interval (T ime), average volatility (V ola), average trade
size (T rSize), average spread (Spread), average price (P rice), and average top of the book
depth (T op).
2.2 Summary Statistics
Based on the ADV we sort stocks into liquidity quintiles q1, q2, q3, q4, q5, starting with the least
liquid quintile q1 and q5 representing the most liquid one. Table 1 reports cross-sectional sample




Mean (in 1000) Median (in 1000) Max (in 1000) Min (in 1000) SD (in 1000)
HB HS H D T otal HB HS H d T otal HB HS H D T otal HB HS H D T otal HB HS H D T otal
least liquid 0.78 0.11 0.89 4.2 5.1 0.2 0.01 0.28 3.7 4.3 39 15 41 29 53 0 0 0 0.01 0.02 2.14 0.49 2.25 2.65 3.8
q2 1.24 0.12 1.36 6.5 7.8 0.45 0.01 0.52 5.9 6.9 60 25 63 43 79 0 0 0 0.03 0.04 3.2 0.68 3.4 3.7 5.3
q3 1.8 0.11 1.9 12 14 0.59 0.01 0.65 11 12 83 27 85 73 120 0 0 0 0.09 0.12 4.8 0.67 4.9 6.4 8.8
q4 2.29 0.12 2.41 14 17 0.55 0.01 0.62 14 15 143 33 145 84 173 0 0 0 0.04 0.07 7 0.82 7.1 7.7 11
most liquid 5.8 0.1 5.8 45 51 1.53 0 1.61 43 47 229 50 231 273 367 0 0 0 0.33 0.5 15 1.03 15 24 30
total 2.37 0.11 2.48 16 19 0.66 0.01 0.74 15 17 111 30 113 100 159 0 0 0 0.1 0.15 6.3 0.74 6.5 8.8 12
Table 1: Sample descriptive statistics sorted by liquidity quintile. The table reports the cross-sectional mean, maximum (Max),
minimum (Min) and standard deviation (SD) for the posted hidden volume without the spread, i.e. “deep” in the book (HB),
in the spread (HS), the total posted hidden liquidity (H), the total posted displayed liquidity (D) and the total posted liquidity
(T otal). Numbers reported in shares.
Generally, more liquid stocks report more volume no matter whether displayed or hidden. Note
that for more liquid stocks the hidden volumes posted in the spread decrease. This is due to
the fact that liquid stocks typically trade at around one tick of spread. For instance Microsoft
has an average spread of 1.06 cent, i.e. in most cases the spread trades at one cent. Therefore,
opportunities to post hidden liquidity within the spreads are few.
Based on liquidity quintiles Table 2 reports cross-sectional averages of ADV , T ime , V ola ,
T rSize , Spread , P rice and T op and the corresponding posted and traded hidden liquidity
volumes by ratio and total volume. Ratio denotes the hidden proportion of the total liquidity.
Generally, more liquid stocks show higher ADV and T op and smaller T ime , Spread , P rice
and T rSize . V ola and T rSize exhibit a weakly pronounced increase for more liquid stocks.
Generally, less liquid stocks trade more hidden. The ratio of executed hidden liquidity drops
from 26 %, for the least liquid quintile, to 7 %, for the most liquid quintile. The decrease
is weaker but nevertheless significant for posted liquidity dropping respectively from 19 % to
13 %. All in all, hidden liquidity accounts for a substantial fraction of trading activity at
16 % (17 %) of posted (traded) liquidity. The findings are in line with earlier studies, for in-
stance see Bessembinder et al. (2009). Table 3 reports cross-correlations between the observable
stock characteristics. Our results suggest that more liquid stocks are characterized by narrower
spreads, smaller inter-trade time, higher traded volume, larger trade sizes, larger top-of-book
depth and smaller prices. Spread and P rice as well as T rSize and T op show strongest corre-
lation. The substantial Spread − P rice correlation is consistent with tight competition among
market-makers. This can bee seen as follows. Assume that the spread would be the same or
larger for lower-priced stocks. As it is reasonable to assume that the market maker’s average
per-share-profit is a monotonically increasing function of Spread
P rice
, in competitive markets market








ADV T ime V ola T rSize Spread P rice T op V olume Ratio V olume Ratio
least liquid 1.39 2.65 0.07 147 4.91 36.46 308 656 0.19 0.37 0.26
q2 2.72 1.38 0.08 158 3.39 32.84 576 1318 0.2 0.57 0.2
q3 4.23 0.94 0.09 165 2.4 27.41 800 1671 0.17 0.69 0.15
q4 7.13 0.61 0.1 178 1.87 24.59 1278 2292 0.16 0.83 0.11
most liquid 16.98 0.35 0.11 219 1.38 23.32 3490 6202 0.13 1.10 0.07
total 6.57 1.19 0.09 174 2.79 28.91 1305 2440 0.17 0.71 0.16
Table 2: Cross-sectional averages for the ADV , T ime , V ola , T rSize , Spread , P rice , T op and the
hidden V olume and Ratio for traded and posted liquidity based on liquidity quintiles. ADV and
traded hidden volume is given in millions of shares. T op , T rSize and volume of posted hidden depth
are given in single shares. T ime is reported in seconds, P rice is reported in dollar and Spread is
reported in ticks (i.e. cents).
and ultimately resulting in lower spreads. Using this kind of Bertrand-competition argument,
we expect that in equilibrium average spread and average price are strongly correlated. More-
over, T rSize and T op correlate, since more posted liquidity is going to attract more liquidity
demand and vice versa. Notice that V ola and Spread show least correlation.
ADV T ime V ola T rSize Spread P rice T op
ADV ∗ −0.570 0.248 0.584 −0.382 −0.213 0.529
T ime ∗ −0.267 −0.298 0.529 0.176 −0.218
V ola ∗ 0.463 −0.146 −0.403 0.287
T rSize ∗ −0.351 −0.490 0.941
Spread ∗ 0.698 −0.285
P rice ∗ −0.42
T op ∗
Table 3: Reporting cross correlation-coefficients for the mean average daily traded volume (ADV ),
volatility (V ola ), the spread (Spread ), price (P rice ) and the top-of-book depth (T op ).
3 Determinants of Hidden Liquidity
In this section, we examine how the observable stock characteristics (i.e. ADV , T ime , V ola ,
T rSize , Spread , P rice , and T op ) relate to the stock’s hidden properties, precisely the mean
posted and traded hidden volumes (ratios), i.e. Hps , Htr (HRps , H
R
tr ). Our main purpose is to
identify the key determinants of the stock’s hidden dimension. Our choice of the explanatory
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variables reflects the holistic approach by covering the observable, standard mean order book
properties (i.e. Spread , P rice , T op ), liquidity quantities (T ime , T rSize , ADV ) as well as its
volatility (V ola ). We provide two models, a standard (linear) model and to account for possible
nonlinear relationships, a partly log-transformed model. The respective standard models read
Hps = α + αAADV + αT iT ime + αV V ola + αT rT rSize
+ αSSpread + αP P rice + αT T op + ǫ1,
HRps = α
R + αRAADV + α
R
T iT ime + α
R
V V ola + α
R
T rT rSize
+ αRS Spread + α
R
P P rice + α
R
T oT op + ǫ2,
Htr = β + βAADV + βT iT ime + βV V ola + βT rT rSize
+ βSSpread + βP P rice + βT oT op + ǫ3,
HRtr = β
R + βRAADV + β
R
T iT ime + β
R
V V ola + β
R
T rT rSize
+ βRS Spread + β
R
P P rice + β
R
T oT op + ǫ4.
(3.1)
For the transformed model, we simultaneously apply log-transforms on selected predictor vari-
ables (mainly the Spread ) as well as on some response variables (i.e. Hps , HRps and Htr ).
log(Hps ) = a + aAADV + aT iT ime + aV V ola + aT rT rSize
+ aSSpread + aP P rice + aT oT op + ǫ5,
log(HRps ) = a
R + aRAADV + a
R
T iT ime + a
r
V V ola + a
R
T rT rSize
+ aRS log(Spread ) + a
R
P P rice + a
R
T oT op + ǫ6,
log(Htr ) = b + bAADV + bT iT ime + bV V ola + bT rT rSize
+ bS log(Spread ) + bP P rice + bT oT op + ǫ7,
HRtr = b
R + bRAADV + b
R
T iT ime + b
R
V V ola + b
R
T rT rSize
+ bRS log(Spread ) + b
R
P P rice + b
R
T oT op + ǫ8,
(3.2)
We apply standard assumptions for the models (3.1) and (3.2). In particular, we assume that
the error terms (ǫi)i=1,2,...,8 (i = 1, 2, ..., 8) are iid and normally distributed.
3.1 Estimation Results
Our results can be summarized in three points. First, according to table 4, both, the linear
models as in (3.1) as well as the transformed ansatz according to (3.2) show a significant
goodness-of-fit in terms of adjusted-r2 as well as f-statistics. For all models, we report r2-
values in a range starting from 0.457 points to up to substantial 0.939 points, depending on
whether hidden ratios or volumes and whether linear or transformed models are considered.
In particular, the model significantly improve earlier models6. Moreover, with 440 degrees of
6De Winne and D’Hondt (2007) report r2 of 0.295 for the correct hidden fraction at the top of the book.
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Posted Hidden Liquidity Traded Hidden Liquidity
Variable Volume Ratio Volume Ratio





















































































































































































Table 4: Parameter estimates of the cross-sectional regression models for traded and posted hidden liquidity volume/ratio
according to the standard linear models in (3.1) and the transformed nonlinear models in (3.2). T-statistics are reported
below the parameter estimates in round brackets. We finally report the adjusted r2, f-statistic and their corresponding
gains in percentages of the standard models (3.1).
freedom, the f-statistics further substantiate model significance beyond the 0.01% significance
level.
Secondly, considering hidden ratios instead of volumes7 and applying the transformation rules
according to (3.2) significantly enhances the predictability of hidden liquidity. For instance, for
posted hidden liquidity, the r2 value increases from 0.495 to 0.695 points, while for traded hidden
liquidity, r2 improves from 0.657 to significant 0.939 points. Similarly, we obtain significant
improvement in model significance according to f-statistics. F-statistics improve from 55 to 147
points for posted and 124 to 978 points for traded hidden liquidity.
Thirdly, generally, the spread is a highly influential determinant of hidden liquidity. In fact, we
observe that hidden ratios are mainly affected by the spread. For instance, for the transformed
models of traded and posted hidden ratios, the spread by far dominates the other determinants
in terms of t-statistics, with t-values of 28.62 and 12.54 respectively. Hidden volumes on the
7Notice, the fact that hidden ratios are better predicted than volumes is of importance, as one can easily
recover the actual hidden volumes from the knowledge of the hidden ratios and the easily accessible displayed
depth.
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other hand, tend to be more susceptible towards liquidity quantities, i.e. inter-trade time, trade
size and ADV .
Finally, our results indicate that stocks trade more hidden, in volume as well as in proportion,
when spreads are large. Price and T op relate to hidden liquidity according to how they correlate
to the spread 3, i.e. generally, hidden liquidity usage increases for higher-priced stocks and
decreases with T op . Liquidity quantities affect hidden liquidity differently. In terms of ADV ,
the more liquid a stock is, the less is the proportion of traded and posted hidden liquidity,
although it increases in absolute volumes. On the other hand, the usage of hidden liquidity
tends to increases with the trade size and with smaller inter-trade times. The impact of volatility
is less substantial is less conclusive.
3.2 A Minimal Model For Hidden Liquidity
The results attest that the order book’s visible dimension can have significant explanatory
power over its hidden properties. Our findings indicate that there is a hierarchy among the pre-
dictor variables. In particular, we found that hidden volumes are better explained by liquidity
quantities while normalized volumes, i.e. hidden ratios, are mainly explained by the spread.
In this section, we make use of a framework, the so called Least Angle Regression (LARS), to
adequately capture this hierarchy. Our aim is to identify a minimal model for hidden liquid-
ity with the most informative predictors, ranked them according to their explanatory power.
Moreover, as the set of determinants partly exhibits strong cross-correlations according to table
3, LARS may help to adequately account for effects of spurious regression.
3.2.1 LARS Methodology
Typically, model selection algorithms such as Lars, Lasso, All Subsets, Forward and Backward
Elimination are used and designed to reduce the number of covariates and to identify an
efficient and parsimonious set of predictor variables.8 According to Efron et al. (2004), “
[the Lasso and Forwards Stagewise Regression] are variants of a basic procedure called Least
Angle Regression. ... [Lars] can be viewed as moderately greedy forward stepwise procedure
whose forward progress is determined by compromising among the currently most correlated
covariates. LARS moves along the most obvious compromise direction, the equiangular vector,
while the Lasso and Stagewise procedure put some restrictions on the equiangular strategy”.
We briefly scratch the Lars methodology as explained in Efron et al. (2004) using their notation.
Lars regression consists of multiple steps. At each step the algorithm builds up successive models
and estimates µ̂ = X β̂ , so that after k steps the model comprises only k parameters that are
8This is particularly useful in high-dimensional statistics as simpler models enhance the scientific insights for
models with high degrees of freedom. See Gelper and Croux (2008) for an application in time series forecasting.
Lars regression is related to the aforementioned model selection algorithms.
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nonzero. More precisely, assume we have m linearly independent covariates x1, x2, ..., xm. And
denote by A some subset of the index set {1, 2, ..., m} with cardinality |A | = a and denote 1 A
the vector of all ones with length equaling a. Then Efron et al. define the following matrices
XA = (· · · sjXj · · · )j∈A , G A = XA ′XA , (3.3)
AA = (1 A ′G −11 A )−
1
2 , w A = AA G −1A 1 A , (3.4)
where sj = ±1 and w A is the unit vector making equal angles, less than 90 degrees, with the
columns of XA . The so called equiangular vector u A then reads as follows:
u A = XA w A with ||u A ||2 = 1. (3.5)
The LARS algorithm can now be described as follows. Starting with the estimate µ̂ 0 = 0 one
successively builds up µ̂ in steps. Therefore, assume µ̂ A to be the current LARS estimate.
Then the current correlation reads
ĉ = X ′ (y − µ̂ A) , (3.6)
where we define the active set A to be the set of indices corresponding to the covariates with
the greatest absolute current correlations, i.e.
Ĉ = max
j
{|ĉj|} and A = {j : |ĉj | = Ĉ}. (3.7)
Now we define
sj = sign{ĉj} j ∈ A (3.8)
and we again compute XA , AA and u A as in (3.3)-(3.5). Finally, the updated estimate µ̂ A +
reads











where min+ indicates that the minimum is taken only over positive components for each choice
of j in (3.9). Once can easily show that the maximum absolute correlation declines with each
step. In other words, the followings holds:
Ĉ+ = Ĉ − γ̂ AA . (3.10)
3.2.2 The Akaike Information Criterion
The Lars procedure as outlined in the previous subsection, provides k model estimates for µ̂
in k steps. However, one wants to know and choose only the best of these models. By best, one
generally means the model that most effectively balances goodness-of-fit and model-parsimony.
Let y denote some dependent variable we want to explain and
y ∝ (µ , σ2I), (3.11)
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indicating that the yi are uncorrelated, with mean µi and variance σ2. Then one can write
(µ̂i − µi)2 = (yi − µ̂i)2 − (yi − µi)2 + 2(µ̂i − µi)(yi − µi). (3.12)
Summing over i and taking expectation yields
E
[






















Now the Akaike information criterion reads
Cp =
||y − µ̂ ||2
σ2
− n + df. (3.15)






order to select the best model among a set of models, one chooses the one with the lowest
Cp value. This model should represent the best trade-off between bias (“accuracy”) and variance
(“complexity”).
3.2.3 LARS Results
Table 5 and 6 report results of the LARS procedure for posted and traded hidden liquidity
according to the models (3.1) and (3.2). We report for each lars-step the selected variable (ac-
tion), its resulting r2-goodness-of-fit (r2lars) and its ratio with the adjusted-r
2 of the respective
full-models (r2ols). Besides r
2-estimates, we also report estimates for Cp .
The LARS results generally confirm the hierarchy among predictor variables, that hidden vol-
ume is mostly affected by liquidity determinants, while hidden ratios are more affected by the
stock’s spread. In particular, for hidden posted and traded volume, we obtain that T rSize ,
ADV , T ime and T op generally rank higher than non-liquidity quantities like Spread . The
picture drastically reverses for hidden ratios, where mainly the Spread and less pronounced
P rice dominate among the predictor variables. In these cases specifically, the spread ranks first
and observe for instance that in the case of the hidden traded ratio, the spread alone explains
already 98% of the predictive power of the full model with all predictor variables (see colum 4
in table 6).
We report some deviations from this hierarchy, particularly with respect to T rSize and P rice .
However, we can attribute these to spurious-regression-effects and inferior fitting. For instance,
T rSize ranks least for traded hidden volume, although it is a liquidity quantity. However, as
T rSize is highly correlated with ADV and T ime according to 3, the addition of ADV or
T ime in early steps of the LARS procedure already incorporates its (full) predictive power into
the model. Hence, the residual explanatory power of T rSize may be neglected in later steps.
14
Secondly, we observe that P rice , although a non-liquidity quantity, ranks highest for hidden
traded volume. However, its r2 value reveals that its statistical contribution is only marginal.
This regression-effect, that the LARS procedure occasionally selects inferior variables has been
observed earlier and tends to be a general problem of model selection procedures. See also
Weisberg (2004) for a more detailed discussion.
15
Posted Hidden Volume Posted Hidden Ratio
























1 T op 0.34 0.73 99 T rSize 0.3 0.46 464 Spread 0.18 0.34 316 Spread 0.29 0.41 601
2 T rSize 0.44 0.94 22 ADV 0.37 0.56 376 P rice 0.4 0.77 108 P rice 0.55 0.78 219
3 ADV 0.45 0.98 9 T ime 0.47 0.71 249 T ime 0.41 0.78 105 V ola 0.59 0.85 159
4 V ola 0.46 0.99 6 P rice 0.6 0.9 84 V ola 0.5 0.96 23 T ime 0.67 0.96 42
5 T ime 0.46 0.99 7 T op 0.65 0.97 27 ADV 0.51 0.97 18 T rSize 0.68 0.97 35
6 Spread 0.46 0.99 9 V ola 0.65 0.98 20 T rSize 0.51 0.98 16 T op 0.7 0.99 12
7 P rice 0.47 1 8 Spread 0.66 1 8 T op 0.52 1 8 ADV 0.7 1 8
Table 5: Lars procedure for posted hidden liquidity.
Executed Hidden Volume Executed Hidden Ratio
























1 P rice 0.05 0.08 796 P rice 0.08 0.09 1657 Spread 0.35 0.41 1476 Spread 0.92 0.98 176
2 T ime 0.21 0.32 585 T ime 0.33 0.41 1072 P rice 0.56 0.66 849 T rSize 0.92 0.98 167
3 ADV 0.4 0.6 343 T op 0.57 0.7 544 ADV 0.69 0.81 468 ADV 0.93 0.99 78
4 T op 0.42 0.63 322 ADV 0.59 0.73 503 T ime 0.72 0.84 393 T op 0.94 0.99 74
5 V ola 0.61 0.92 70 V ola 0.73 0.9 189 T rSize 0.79 0.92 199 P rice 0.94 0.99 70
6 Spread 0.66 1 8 Spread 0.8 1 11 T op 0.84 0.99 32 T ime 0.94 1 23
7 T rSize 0.66 1 8 T rSize 0.81 1 8 V ola 0.85 1 8 V ola 0.94 1 8
Table 6: Reporting results of the LARS procedure for traded hidden liquidity. For each LARS-step we report the choice of the selected variable (”‘action”’), the
current goodness-of-fit in terms of pure (r2lars and relative to the full model r
2
0 as reported in table 4 and finally the Akaike information Criteria Cp.
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4 Impact and Information Content of Hidden Orders
Apart from looking at the cross-sectional determinants of hidden liquidity, our second con-
tribution considers its impact on the stock market. In particular, in this section we shift
our attention to temporal and dynamic aspects of hidden order submission, rather than its
cross-sectional properties. The temporal dimension of liquidity is directly affected by investor’s
trading behavior. Hence, detecting distinct temporal features between displayed and hidden
liquidity may help to identify the true motifs of (hidden) order submission. In fact, the ques-
tion who the originators of hidden liquidity and what their intentions are is a highly active
and ongoing area of market microstructure research as it is intimately related with aspects of
market quality, fair trading procedures and market regulation. We will in particular analyze
whether or not the presence of hidden liquidity is associated with informed trading. To motivate
our program, we recycle an earlier result. To this end, recall table 1, were descriptive sample
statistics for displayed and hidden depth. From the given numbers, we can construct the so
called coefficient-of-variation, σ
µ
(see table 7). As usual σ denoted the standard-deviation and µ






Table 7: Coefficients of Variation for hidden and displayed liquidity.
exceeds the one for displayed liquidity by a factor of roughly 5. In particular, this indicates
a substantially higher degree of statistical dispersion and variance for hidden as compared to
displayed liquidity. This assertion is confirmed by observing the time evolution of the total
(displayed and hidden) depth in the limit order book for a random stock, Health Care REIT
(figure 1). Indeed, the hidden depth evolution (blue curve) appears to exhibit a more irregular
and variable pattern as compared to the displayed time evolution and is characterized by large
spikes accompanied by extended period of low-depth activity. Displayed depth on the other
hand exhibits a less spiky and more evenly distributed temporal pattern. The hidden spikes
are significant as in this case they can roughly account for more than 15 times the average total
displayed depth in the book.
The very fact that these arguably large spikes emerge and vanish in the course of only a few
minutes provides a strong indication that they were originated by individual large traders,
rather than a collective crowd of investors who coincidentally happened to place orders at the
same time.9 Two questions naturally arise out of this observation: 1) What is true motif of
these large hidden traders? Do these shocks of hidden liquidity represent liquidity or informed
9This reasoning would be in line with prior empirical findings that suggest that hidden orders are mainly
used by large investors, see Bessembinder et al. (2009) for instance.
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Figure 1: Time Series evolution of hidden and displayed depth in the order book for 6500 consecutive
minutes for a selected stock of the S&P 500.
traders? 2) What is the impact of hidden liquidity on the stock market? In particular, how do
large spikes of hidden orders affect the properties of the market?
4.1 Concentration and Dispersion of Hidden Liquidity
First, we will try to confirm the above observation on more solid empirical grounds. To this
end, we introduce a range of measures to estimate the degree of dispersion or localization of
hidden and displayed liquidity and check if we can quantify any notable difference between
the two. We will estimate the dispersion along two dimensions: price and time. For the
purpose of defining the measures we first introduce some notation. Denote xhij (x
d
ij) the hidden
(displayed) depth at time ti (i = 1, ..., n) at price quote pj (0 ≤ j ≤ m) for some stock. The

















im) respectively. We assume that the list of prices is finite and m
denotes the maximum number of price quotes. Moreover, we denote by yhi (y
d
i ) the total










ij). Their time evolution
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m) hold.
4.1.1 Measures of Liquidity Concentration/Dispersion
To reduce the risk in measure-specification and to achieve robust estimation, we conduct our
analysis by applying four measures. Our first measure is motivated by the concept of entropy.10
10The entropy measure has historical roots. It was established as early as the pioneering works of Boltzmann
and Gibbs in the field of classical statistical mechanics and in statistical quantum mechanics. In thermodynamics,
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In line with our desire to capture dispersion along both, the time and the price domain, we
























































with q = d, h and i = 1, ..., n . The choice of the normalization factors, 1log(n)
and 1log(m) , where n and m denote the respective sample (state) sizes, ensures that entropy
is normalized and values range between 0 and 1, which facilitates cross-sectional comparison
and comparisons across different sample sizes.11 It is well-known that the entropy measure is
non-negative and that it takes on its maximum value for equidistributed weights (i.e. state of
highest dispersion) and its minimum when all but one weight is non-zero (i.e. state of highest









where σ denotes the respective sample’s standard-deviation and µ its the standard mean. We
prefer the coefficient of variation over the more standard variance-to-mean ratio (σ
2
µ
) as it is
normalized and thus facilitates cross-sample comparisons.
Entropy (4.2) and the coefficient-of-variation (4.3) are constructed to scale with the degree of
dispersion. However, the numbers hardly allow for an illustrative understanding of the degree
of dispersion. To account for this deficit, in the last step, we provide an additional measure,
namely the minimum fraction of elements of a vector that account for at least a fraction s of
the total sum of the vector. Or more formally, consider the values of yq and xqi in descending
order and denote the respective vectors x̃qi and ỹ






, j = 1, ..., m and xqij =
∑j
r=1 xikr . Then we can define the measures of


























entropy is understood to represent the degree of dispersion (or disorder) in the thermodynamical system’s micro




pi log pi, where pi represents the probability of a finite system to reside in the state i, where kB
denotes the Boltzmann-constant. Nowadays, entropy finds more and more use in social and economic sciences.
For instance, see Hart (1971)
11Observe that without the chosen normalization, entropy would increase with the sample size and thus the
notion of concentration would consequently depend on the sample size n.
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The smaller this number, the fewer states occupy s percent of the overall depth. For example























We check, that indeed 20 percent of the state j = 5 occupy more than the fraction s of the
total depth.
We aggregate time dispersion estimates across stocks in the usual way. As an example, consider








For the price dispersion estimates correspond to each time ti. Hence we need to pre-average
on a per stock basis before cross-aggregating the results. To this end, consider again for each




i=1 And denote σ
2(φbookk ) the










4.1.2 Estimation Results and Discussion
Table 8 and 9 report estimation results grouped in liquidity quintiles as in the previous fashion.
Estimates for the entropy (φ) are grouped in the first column, the coefficient of variation (C)
in the second and the localization measure (L) for s = 0.50, 0.80 are shown in the third and
forth column of each table. We show estimates for each, hidden, displayed as well as total
posted liquidity. Table 8 reports estimation of the average price-dispersion of liquidity, while
table 9 reports estimates for the time-dispersion of liquidity. The results of table 8 and 9 can
be broadly summarized in five points. First, hidden liquidity is significantly more localized
(i.e. less dispersed) in the time, as well as in the price domain. In particular, consistent with
the observations in figure 1 hidden liquidity tends to happen more sporadically in time and is
more concentrated on fewer price quotes than displayed liquidity. For instance, according to
the Lbookin table 8, 26% of price quotes already contain more than 80% of the hidden volume.
While 80% of displayed liquidity is only contained in 56% of the quotes. In the same way, table
9 shows, that hidden liquidity is concentrated on few time points, whereas the time evolution of
displayed liquidity tends to be more spread out in time. Secondly, the difference in the degree of
dispersion between hidden and displayed liquidity seems to be larger in the time domain than
in the price domain. For instance, while the unconditional order book entropies for hidden
and displayed liquidity report 0.86 and 0.97, we obtain entropies for the same pair of 0.19 and
0.71 in the time domain. Thirdly, by the third column, we observe that hidden liquidity varies
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significantly more than displayed liquidity. Our unconditional coeficient of variation reports
2.72 for hidden and 0.73 for displayed liquidity in the price domain and 2.88 and 1.23 in the time
domain. Fourthly, these results essentially don’t depend on the stock’s liquidity. We only report
significant differences between liquidity quintiles with respect to the price-dispersion (i.e. table
8). Apart from a few exceptions, it appears that the concentration of hidden depth increases
with a stock’s liquidity. Fifth, the fact that hidden liquidity varies strongly, together with the
fact that hidden liquidity is concentrated on fewer price quotes and submitted sporadically
in time, suggests that hidden liquidity enters the market in few large blocks that are short-
lived, whereas displayed liquidity enters the market more regularly and more continously and
moderate in sizes. This is conistent with figure 1.
Liquidity
Quintiles
φ C L0.50 L0.80
hidden displayed total hidden displayed total hidden displayed total hidden displayed total
lowest 0.88 0.97 0.97 2.45 0.82 0.92 0.09 0.24 0.24 0.3 0.54 0.54
2 0.87 0.97 0.97 2.61 0.77 0.87 0.09 0.26 0.25 0.3 0.55 0.56
3 0.86 0.97 0.97 2.69 0.72 0.84 0.08 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.56 0.56
4 0.84 0.98 0.97 3.04 0.69 0.88 0.06 0.28 0.26 0.23 0.57 0.57
highest 0.85 0.98 0.98 2.81 0.66 0.78 0.06 0.29 0.27 0.22 0.59 0.59
total 0.86 0.97 0.97 2.72 0.73 0.86 0.08 0.27 0.26 0.26 0.56 0.56
Table 8: Measures of Dispersion for the order book distribution of hidden, displayed and total depth.
Estimates are shown for four measures, φ, C, L0.50 and L0.80
Liquidity
Quintiles
φ C L0.50 L0.80
hidden displayed total hidden displayed total hidden displayed total hidden displayed total
least 0.2 0.62 0.58 3.11 1.46 1.87 0.1 0.2 0.15 0.13 0.37 0.29
2 0.21 0.66 0.64 2.87 1.35 1.62 0.1 0.21 0.17 0.14 0.4 0.34
3 0.2 0.72 0.69 2.81 1.22 1.41 0.11 0.23 0.2 0.14 0.44 0.39
4 0.17 0.75 0.73 2.82 1.15 1.31 0.1 0.24 0.21 0.14 0.47 0.42
highest 0.16 0.82 0.78 2.8 0.95 1.1 0.11 0.28 0.25 0.14 0.53 0.49
total 0.19 0.71 0.68 2.88 1.23 1.46 0.1 0.23 0.2 0.14 0.44 0.38
Table 9: Measures of Dispersion for the temporal distribution of hidden, displayed and total depth.
Estimates are shown for four measures, φ, C, L0.50 and L0.80
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4.2 Hidden Liquidity Impact: Informed or Liquidity Traders?
Our previous results establish that indeed hidden liquidity is more concentrated on single price
quotes and enter the market sporadically, suggesting that the presence of hidden liquidity
is associated to single large orders, whereas we observe a more regular and continuous and
steady provision of displayed liquidity. Naturally, the question arises what drives these hidden
liquidity-spikes and whether these large chunks of hidden liquidity carry valuable information
with respect to future returns. Are they even related to informed trading? What motivates
traders to issue large, hidden short-lived orders? And, how does hidden liquidity, as compared
to displayed liquidity affect the market in general? We will further explore these connections
in the course of this section and try to derive clues towards the true motifs behind large hidden
orders. In particular, we will analyze the effect of large hidden order imbalances on the different
dimensions of the market, i.e. volatility, return, spread and depth. We will also compare the
results with the corresponding impact of displayed imbalances, to discern the main feature of
hidden orders. We will use an event-study-framework as outlined in Campbell et al. (1997)
and recently applied in a work on quantifying market reactions to real-time news sentiment
announcements, see Gross-Klussmann and Hautsch (2010).
For this purpose, we first define events of significant imbalance-skew, i.e. liquidity shocks. That
is, markets that exhibit an order-imbalance of a minimum magnitude. Specifically, to capture
hidden peculiarities, we will distinguish between displayed and hidden order-imbalances. Hence,





displayed, hidden and total depth at time ti on the bid-side of the order book and Daski , H
ask
i






i holds. Then we define


















Let us now fix an imbalance-threshold, say I. We call a time-point tj an event of large hidden
(displayed) excess-imbalance, whenever the corresponding imbalance exceeds the critical value
I, i.e. IHi > I (I
D
i > I). As we will have to consider cross-sectional comparison between
different stocks, we need to normalize the choice of I and make it independent of the specific
stock at hand. With this in mind, given each stocks total imbalances ITi , we consider its
p-quantile-function F −1T (p).
12 Now we define the threshold values according to
Ip := F −1T (p). (4.9)
Now the choice of the critical threshold imbalance Ip depends solely on p ∈ [0, 1], which nor-
malizes the threshold imbalance. By considering the total instead of the displayed or hidden
imbalances for identifying the threshold imbalances, we reduce the hidden/displayed selection
bias.
12The quantile function is defined as F −1(p) := inf{x ∈ R+ : F (x) ≥ p}, where F denotes the cumulative
distribution of x.
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We now fix an imbalance quantile p. Let X = (Xt1 , Xt2 , ..., Xtm) denote some market quantity.












≥ Ip] . (4.10)
Notice that for δ > 0, we study the ex-post, while for δ < 0 we study the respective ex-ante
impact. In the usual fashion, we conduct cross-sectional aggregation by weighted averages,
where the weights equal the inverse of the respective sample variances. In other words, for










































We will henceforth concentrate on the stock’s realized volatility, spread, depth and the so called
cumulative abnormal return CAR .
4.2.1 Cumulative Abnormal Returns
In defining abnormal returns, we follow closely Campbell et al. (1997). As a model for stock
k′s “normal returns” we assume the following market model:
Rkti = αk + βkR
market
ti
+ ǫkti . (4.12)
As usual ti denotes time and ǫkti normal and iid, random variable. R
market
t is the so called
market return, and stock i’s actual return Rit.
13 We will henceforth choose the S&P 500 index
as the market return. In order to derive CAR , first we estimate (4.12), based on the 1-minute-
snapshot NASDAQ Modelview data. Estimation is done without including the event windows.
Provided with the parameter estimates αk and βk, we may again use (4.12) to compute the
single abnormal returns according to R̂kti = R
k
ti
− α̂k − β̂kR
market
ti
. Now, starting at some time






(R̂ktl + 1) − 1. (4.13)
4.3 Impact Estimates
Figures 4, 5, 3, and 2 provide estimates of realized volatility, spread, total depth, and cumulative
abnormal returns conditional on excess hidden and displayed order-imbalances according to
(4.10) and (4.11). To test for generical effects, we report estimates for varying degrees of
13Typically Rmarket is chosen to be some predictor for the stock’s actual return. For instance, in the most
simple case, one may choose the stock’s expected return.
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imbalance Ip, i.e. p = 60%, 70%, 80%, 90%. We may henceforth refer to the event when order-
imbalance exceeds the critical imbalance threshold Ip a large order imbalance shock (LOS).
Impact estimates have been conducted for δ = −60 min to (one hour pre-LOS) to up to
δ = 120 min (two hours post-LOS). The realized conditional mean estimates are each drawn
with respect to the time-lag δ. Spreads volatility and depth are normalized to the unconditional
mean spread, to wit a value of one represents the unconditional mean. The red-colored line
represents the estimated mean conditional on hidden excess-imbalance, while the blue-colored
line represents the respective estimate for the case of displayed excess-imbalances. The light-red
and light-blue colored lines correspond to the respective upper and lower confidence intervals,
obtained by standard t-tests. To check for statistical significane, thick black lines provide the
unconditional standard deviation of the spread itself.
4.3.1 Return Impact
The impact on abnormal returns is shown in figure 2. The results can be summarized in two
points. First, the expost impact of large hidden orders is significant and qualitatively follows
expost a square-root law On the other hand, impact is hardly observed for displayed liquidity.
For instance, after one hour of trading (δ = 60), hidden liquidity generates about 35 basis
points of cumulated abnormal returns for high imbalances, i.e. p = 90% (blue line). Even
for lower excess imbalance, i.e. p = 40%, hidden liquidity still manages to generate up to 13
basispoints impact on cumulated abnormal returns. In comparison, at high imbalances, i.e.
p = 90%, displayed LOS generates only minor 3.5 basis points impact on cumulated returns
after 60 minutes of trading (δ = 60). Hence, as the average market impact for market orders
follows a square-root-law14, our findings strongly suggest, that the large hidden orders, as they
are less likely to get executed, get cancelled and feeded to the market via market orders. On the
other hand, results indicate that large displayed depth gets consumed by other liquidity-seeking
investors. We wil revive this argument in a more detailed discussiion in section in 4.4.
A comparison to a recent study on the information content of news related to earnings an-
nouncements illustrates how substantial the impact of hidden LOS is. Gross-Klussmann and
Hautsch (2010) report that news arrivals exert substantial impact on cumulated abnormal re-
turns. For instance, approximately 7 minutes after arrival of positive news, the cumulated
abnormal return may reach about 7 basis points for significant news items. Our results suggest
that this level of return impact can be reached for hidden LOS at an imbalance level of p = 60%.
For even larger hidden imbalances, i.e. p = 90%, the cumulated abnormal return reaches up
to 10 basis points. More than that, the impact on cumulated returns is shown to be persistent
beyond 60 minutes. Our analysis thus suggests, that hidden orders can have a higher impact
on prices than relevant news items.
Secondly, aside the expost impact (δ > 0) we observe significant exante impact for both,
14See for instance Farmer and Lillo (2003).
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displayed and hidden LOS: for p = 70%, the prior increase in CAR reaches 29 basispoints for
hidden and only about 20 basispoints for displayed imbalances. This difference reduces for
smaller imbalances as for p = 40% we obtain 21 basispoints for hidden and 19 basispoints
for displayed LOS at the 40%-level of imbalance. Moreover, the positive pre-event impact
on abnormal returns suggests, that large hidden and displayed orders tend to be submitted
in trending markets, that is hidden order traders tend to be momentum traders. This is in
line with previous findings as reported by Pascual and Tornero (2003); Griffin et al. (2003).
However, in contrast to Pascual and Tornero, we argue that this assertion is not necessarily
due private information, as momentum trading is driven by revealed and public information.




































































Figure 2: Impact of Hidden Order Imbalances on the cumulated abnormal return at around times of
hidden order submissions. We report cumulated abnormal returns conditional on varying degrees of
hidden (displayed) order imbalances p.
4.3.2 Volatility Impact
We now turn our attention to the volatility impact in figure 3. From its exante impact (i.e.
δ < 0) we deduce that hidden LOS happen when volatility is comparably low. In other words,
large hiden order traders tend to submit their orders when volatility is low. For instance,
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p = 90%, volatility is approximately 27% lower than itshistorical mean, significantly below
its lower standard deviation. On the other hand, at post-submission time (δ > 0), volatility
shows a substantial increase. The effect for displayed displayed LOS is less pronounced and
occurs mostly within the band of historic standard deviation. In fact, we will show in later
chapters that the increase of volatility for hidden LOS is a natural consequence of the increase
in cumulative abnormal returns and the discrete sampling of realized volatility.
















































































































Figure 3: Impact of Hidden Order Imbalances on the realized 10-minute volatility at around times of
hidden order submissions. We report the volatility conditional on varying degrees of hidden (displayed)
order imbalances p. Volatility has been normalized by the historical volatility.
4.3.3 Spread Impact
Our results strongly suggest a significant decline in the spread up to 10-15 minutes prior to hid-
den LOS. In terms of standard deviation, the declines are significant reaching more than 10% as
compared its mean spread. Likewise, spreads narrow down for displayed LOS at approximately
the same amplitude around their peak level (δ ≈ 0) as well. However, they show pronounced
reaction 10-15 minutes prior to the imbalance-shock. On the contrary, for hidden imbalances,
spreads start to decline earlier. Moreover, it is interesting to note that for large imbalances, say
26
































































































Figure 4: Impact of Hidden Order Imbalances on the realized spread at around times of hidden order
submissions. We report realized spread conditional on varying degrees of hidden (displayed) order
imbalances p. Spread has been normalized by its historical mean.
p = 90%, the maximum decline is stronger (peaked at δ ≈ 0) for displayed LOS than for hidden.
Concerning the post-LOS (δ > 0) impact, we observe that spreads recover its mean level after
approximately 70 minutes of trading when imbalances are large, i.e. p = 90, 80. They retain
normal levels already after 20 minutes of trading for smaller imbalances (p = 60%). On the
other hand, in case a hidden LOS, the post-event impact is significantly stronger and spreads
widen up more. After an hour of trading (δ ≈ 60 min), spreads still reside at the upper level of
standard-deviation, whereas spreads never reach that level in the case of displayed imbalance
shocks.
4.3.4 Depth Impact
Figure 5 reports results for the total depth impact. Similar to the previous findings, total depth
shows its peak at event-time (δ = 0). Results are in line with naive expectation. Note that
total depth is larger in case of displayed imbalances than hidden imbalances. For instance, at
event-time (δ = 0) and for large imbalances, say p = 90%, displayed imbalances lead to total
27
































































































Figure 5: Impact of Hidden Order Imbalances on the total depth in the book at around times of
hidden order submissions. We report the total order depth mean conditional on varying degrees of
hidden (displayed) order imbalances p. Total depth is normalized by the historical total depth.
depth equaling 3.5 the average total depth in the book. Hidden imbalances on the other hand
only increase the depth by a factor of roughly 1.8. We can easily explain this observation. To




(1 + ǫbid) Hask =
H
2




(1 + ǫbid) Dask =
D
2
(1 + ǫask), (4.15)
where H and D are fixed and assume ǫbid and ǫask, Dbid1 to be non-negative, iid, random




(ǫbid − ǫask) ID =
D
2
(ǫbid − ǫask) . (4.16)
Then the total depths reads T = Hbid + Hask + Dbid + Dask and from table 2 in section 2, we
know that generally total displayed depth is larger than total hidden depth, i.e. D ≥ H , we
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can write their conditional expectations as follows
E[T |IH > Ip] = E[Dbid + Dask|IH > Ip] + E[Hbid + Hask|IH > Ip]








(ǫbid − ǫask) > Ip
]
∗








(ǫbid − ǫask) > Ip
]
∗∗








(ǫbid − ǫask) > Ip
]
= E[T |ID > Ip].
(4.17)
In step ∗ and ∗∗ we only used the fact that D ≥ H holds. This confirms, that total liquidity
conditional on displayed imbalances must be larger than total liquidity conditional on hidden
imbalances, which is solely a result of the fact that on average there is more displayed depth D
in the market than hidden depth H .
4.4 Further Discussion
We report that hidden order submission is associated with larger postsubmission returns and
volatility. On the other hand, the impact of displayed depth is only marginal. In the following
sections, we will show why this is consistent with the view that hidden orders are used by
unsophisticated liquidity traders, not informed traders. Moreover, we will elaborate on the
consequences for the hidden order trader as well as for overall market quality.
Our results suggests a square-root-law like expost market impact structure for hidden liquidity,
while it is literally “flat” for displayed liquidity. This suggests that hidden order traders trade
their residual hidden size via market orders, while as displayed traders do not. This suggests
that displayed depth gets consumed by other liquidity-seeking investors upon observation. Be-
cause hidden depth is kept hidden, these traders can not trade against these orders. Eventually,
the hidden order trader has to use market orders, with the said effect on market impact.
4.4.1 Unsophisticated Liquidity Traders, why Hidden Orders Cause Price Impact
and Grossmann’s Conjecture
Our results suggests a square-root-like law for the market impact of hidden liquidity. Square-
root market impact laws have been associated with market order submissions in recent literature
Farmer and Lillo (2003). Moreover, we find that the expost impact of large hidden orders
critically depends on the magnitude of imbalance (i.e. order size). These results strongly
suggest that the hidden order trader is using market orders to fulfill his trading target, as his
hidden orders are less likely to get executed.15 On the other hand, as we report no significant
expost market impact for displayed depth, our results suggest that (large) hidden depth is
15As markets generally penalize the use of hidden orders through priority arrangements, hidden orders by
nature are less likely to get executed. For empirical evidence, see Bessembinder et al. (2009).
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not succeeded by market order submission, indicating that displayed depth gets consumed by
other “opportunistic” liquidity-seeking investors (i.e. latent liquidity).16 This also suggests that
large hidden order traders in their majority are irrational, as their strategy clearly increases
transaction costs.
We want to point out that this reasoning is essentially in analogy of Grossmann’s view about
secondary, so called upstairs markets. Namely, he predicts that as the trader taps into unex-
pressed additional liquidity sources (i.e. latent liquidity) in the upstairs market, trading costs
and price impact are expected to be lower as compared to the anonymous downstairs mar-
ket (Grossmann, 1992). Indeed, Bessembinder and Venkatamaran (2004); Booth et al. (2002)
could empirically prove that markets with an additional upstairs markets are associated with
less transaction costs and smaller price impact. This is absolutely in line with our previous
assertion about hidden traders. Namely, by not displaying his intentions, the hidden order
trader unwittingly bypasses a potentially large pool of uncommitted and unexpressed liquidity.
In the end, he has to pay higher trading costs and generates higher price impact. Hence, This
reasoning of course, strongly relies on the assumption, that not only there is latent liquidity
but that their net liquidity supply/demand is large enough to compensate for the downside risk
faced by parasitic traders, see Harris (1997).
Thus together with the previous results and the assumption, that there is latent liquidity,
several implications follow. First large hidden order traders are not only not informed but they
are truly unsophisticated. In other words, large institutional investors are misled into believing
that hidden orders are advantageous. As they will likely cancel their orders and subsequently
use market orders, trading with displayed limit orders in the presence of opposite-side hidden
orders is beneficial. Especially, we conjecture that in markets with a high degree of hidden
liquidity provision the rate of market orders and order cancellations increases.
4.4.2 Does Hidden Liquidity increase Volatility?
Let us draw attention to the second aspect of the consequences of (large) liquidity trader’s
using hidden orders, namely its effect on the stock price volatility. To this end note that it
is safe to say that realized volatility will be larger in high-return markets as return positively
affects volatility. This follows from the fact, that realized volatility is measured over discrete
time intervals. To see this, assume the standard price process as a geometric Brownian motion
at discrete times ti, i.e. Sti+1 − Sti = Sti
(
µ(ti+1 − ti) + σ (W (ti+1) − W (ti))
)
. Where as usual
W (t) denotes the standard Wiener process. Assume equidistant partition of the time line, i.e.
∆t = ti+1 − ti, such that T = ∆tN . Now consider the realized volatility as the sum of squared
16In the sense of Admati and Pfleiderer (1988), we consider latent liquidity to be comprised as the set of
passive traders that have discretion over when to trade (discretionary traders) and prefer to trade when they
observe “thick” market – that is, when they believe trading has little effect on prices.
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µ2∆t2 + σ2 (W (ti+1) − W (ti))
2 + 2µ∆tσ (W (ti+1) − W (ti))
)
= Nµ2∆t2 + σ2
N∑
i=1
(W (ti+1) − W (ti))
2 + 2µσ (W (ti+1) − W (ti))
(4.18)
Now taking expectations, we obtain

















E [(W (ti+1) − W (ti))]︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0




= µ2T ∆t + σ2T
(4.19)
It follows that as realized volatility is measured at discrete times, i.e. ∆t > 0, any non-zero
drift (i.e. return) is going to increase volatility itself. Of course, in the limit ∆t → 0 we have
the well known result
lim
∆t→0
V ola ∆t = σ2T, (4.20)
that volatility does only depend on the risk source of the underlying price process, namely σ.
In particular, together with the previous findings, that hidden orders induce high returns, we
can conclude that markets with hidden order provision have higher volatility. This assertion
is also consistent with our empirical volatility-impact estimates in figure 3, that shows that
the submission of (large) hidden orders (i.e. hidden imbalances) increases intertemporally the
post-submission volatility as well as earlier empirical studies that attribute hidden liquidity to
increased volatility (Tuttle, 2003; Aitken et al., 2001). This conclusion substantiates in particu-
lar our earlier correspondence between primary markets that provide hidden orders and markets
without upstairs trade-negotiation. Remember that on both trading-mechanisms, trading costs
and induced price impact are large because traders misleadingly do not or structurally can
not - using Grossmann’s formulation - tap into additional unexpressed sources of liquidity. In
particular, by the arguments in (4.19), we expect that not only markets with hidden order
provision exhibit larger volatility, but markets without upstairs markets do so as well. Indeed,
Smith et al. (2001) show empirically that this is exactly the case.
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A second point, Moinas (2010) suggests that the role of volatility is ambiguous. Indeed for
instance, while Aitken et al. (2001) reports that volatility increases hidden order proportions
(or vice versa), results in Bessembinder et al. (2009) rather suggest that greater return volatility
is associated with a lower likelihood of hidden order usage. However, these two empirical
findings are not conflicting at all. While Bessembinder et al. study the affect of volatility
on traders’ exposure decision, Aitken et al. on the other hand study how the overall use of
hidden orders relate the stock’s unconditional volatility. Although intimately related, these
two views are not identical. The first study analyzes the cross-sectional link between volatility
and hidden liquidity, whereas the latter studies its intertemporal dimension. Indeed, according
to the estimates of the volatility impact in figure 3, we report two distinct effects. One is the
presubmission (or ex-ante) impact, the other is the post-submission (ex-post) impact. From the
ex-ante impact of hidden LOS, we clearly observe that the submission of large hidden orders (i.e.
hidden imbalances) takes place when volatility is low compared to its historical level. However,
after submission, the volatility of price quickly recovers and even may significantly exceed
beyond its historical level. Hence, low volatility indeed attracts hidden traders as predicted by
Bessembinder et al.. However, ex-post, volatility will increase (in line with Aitken et al.). We
conclude, that hidden orders are not used to mitigate adverse-selection risks.
5 Conclusion
Using NASDAQ Modelview-data, we cross-sectionally analyze and identify the main determi-
nants of posted and traded hidden liquidity for the S&P500. Observable stock quantities suffice
to explain the presence of hidden liquidity as we report compelling goodness-of-fit. Using a
model-selection approach, we identify the stock’s average spread as the main determinant for
the the proportion of traded and posted hidden liquidity. Hidden traded and posted volumes
are better explained by quantities that represent the liquidity dimension of a stock.
Secondly, we find that hidden liquidity localized around few price quotes and few points in
time. That is, hidden liquidity tends to enter the market in individual large chunks, sporad-
ically in time, resembling spike-dynamics. These observations motivate the question whether
hidden orders are related to single informed trader or more generally and whether hidden orders
carry informational content with respect to future price evolution. We conduct an event-study
analysis to check how the significant skews in the hidden and displayed order-imbalance affect
(ex-post and ex-ante) the different dimensions of the markets. Our findings reveal a discrepancy
between displayed and hidden liquidity, in that the presence of (large) hiden orders carry sub-
stantial information, whereas the informational content of displayed liquidity is negligeable. In
particular, we find that the information content of hidden orders is persistent and can exceed the
information content of news related to important earnings-announcements. Besides increased
abnormal returns, we report an ex-post increase in volatility that is associated with hidden
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order submission. Moreover, our ex-ante analyisis suggest that hidden orders are submitted in
trending markets and when spreads and volatility are comparatively low.
By observing a simple analogy to Grossmann’s conjecture about stocks that don’t trade in
upstairs market, we are able to tie together these different and to some degree seemingly,
contradictory observations. According to Grossmann, taping into additional, unexpressed (la-
tent) liquidity sources reduces transaction costs, price impact and consequently volatility in
markets. Exactly these stylized facts are observed when institutional investors submit hidden
orders instead of displayed orders. Obiously, institutional investors are misled into believing
that hiding their intentions to trade improves their execution performance. Contrary, as we
claim, as institutional investors are not likely to match their total liquidity demand with the
markets endogenous liquidity flow, they need to attract additional, unexpressed liquidity to the
market by exposing their full interest-to-trade a-priori. In failing to do so, the likelihood of
cancelling the hidden order and subsequently issuing a large market order increases, in effect
bypassing uncommitted latent liquidity and thus causing price impact, large transaction costs
and thereby higher volatility. In other words, as the non-discretionary, institutional investor
chooses to hide his intention-to-trade, the discretionary opportunity trader (latent liquidity)
will less likely detect the counterpart, and therefore mutual commitment of liquidity and trades
will be less synchronized. Hence, our results suggest, that not only is using hidden orders
suboptimal for institutional investors but hidden orders in primary market can create negative
liquidity externalities.
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